We propose a micro-econometric evaluation of the relation between life satisfaction and income distribution, using a balanced panel survey of the Russian population (RLMS), running from 1994 to 2000, covering 4685 individuals. We show that in the context of the very volatile Russian environment, Hirschman's (1973) "tunnel effect" conjecture seems to be confirmed: variables reflecting income distribution do not influence satisfaction through social comparisons; individuals rather seem to use their informational content in order to form their expectations. The reference group's income thereby exerts a positive influence on individual satisfaction, which contrasts with other studies on the subject. Inequality indices do not affect individual welfare.
I. Introduction
How does income distribution affect individual utility? In a seminal paper, Hirschman (1973) suggested that individuals could derive positive flows of utility from observing other people's faster progression if they interpret this evolution as a sign that their turn will come soon (for instance if the other lane of cars starts progressing towards the exit while their lane is still immobile during a traffic jam inside a tunnel). Dubbed the "tunnel effect" after the metaphor used by the author, this suggests that rising inequality may increase welfare, even for the poor, if it is interpreted as a positive signal with respect to likely future outcomes. This is at odds with the vision of Thurow ( 1977) who indicated that people may dislike inequality as such because they have quasi-aesthetic preferences for more equal distributions of wealth.
The same opposition exists regarding the interpretation of the income of one's reference group, which can be defined as the set of "relevant others" (e.g. peers, neighbours, colleagues, former schoolmates, etc.). On the one hand, the notion that utility is relative dates back to Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) and implies that individual utility depends on comparison to a reference level. This comparison effect has been documented empirically since then, e.g. van de Stadt et al. (1985) and Clark and Oswald (1996) ; a consequence is that reference group income should affect individual utility negatively. On the other hand, Hirschman's conjecture suggests that an individual can use the observation of his reference group's income as a source of information about his own perspectives (see also Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 2001) , and hence derive positive utility from it. In summary, income distribution may affect subjective welfare in at least two ways: either as a direct argument in individual utility, or as a piece of information used to form expectations about future variables 1 . Our purpose is to try to disentangle these two aspects, focusing on the notion of the reference level of income.
We analyze life satisfaction, using 5 rounds (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) Our interpretation considers transition in Russia as a natural experiment characterized by an unusually high variance in absolute and relative incomes. Transition countries have effectively witnessed large movements in the distribution of wealth, income and labor market status, since the early 1990's, due to the transformation of the coordination system, the productive structure and relative prices in the economy. These evolutions have been associated with a high degree of uncertainty both at the individual level (employment and income perspectives) and at the aggregate level (macroeconomic and regulatory environment). Rising income inequality has been an important part of this evolution 2 . In the particular case of Russia, the presence of mineral and energy resources, and their privatization through the 1995 «loans for share» program, has led to a sharp increase in the income gap. Swings in macroeconomic policy have also hit the population's income, from the years of high inflation 1992-1995, through a period of monetary austerity and exchange rate stability, until the 1998 devaluation and the following resumption of growth (see Lokshin et al., 2000) . Russia is thus an ideal case to test Hirschman's conjecture, as it enshrines all the necessary ingredients: uncertainty, growing inequality and prospects for development. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) have already advocated the presence of such a "tunnel effect" in Russia, based on the analysis of the demand for income redistribution in 1996.
Analyzing the answers to the question "do you agree that the government should restrict the income of the rich?", they show that individuals who agree are not necessarily those who are poorer, but rather those whose perspectives are more uncertain. This is consistent with the conjecture that it is not inequality per se that affects individual utility. We pursue the exploration of this issue, concentrating on the notion of the reference level of income. We show that in the very volatile Russian environment, individuals react favorably to a rise in their reference group's income, suggesting that the informational effect dominates the comparison effect.
As an illustration, consider the fate of the agriculture and government administration workers across the five rounds of the RLMS. It is striking that their individual satisfaction moves with the average income of their professional group rather than with their individual income. The remainder of this paper explores this finding more systematically, i.e. controlling for the other determinants of life satisfaction. The next section presents the empirical strategy, while section 3 discusses the results and section 4 concludes.
Empirical strategy
We use rounds 5 to 9 of the RLMS representative household survey, running from (Table 2) , the distribution of the population into satisfaction categories varies during the period considered, with a general movement of decreasing satisfaction until 1998 followed by a rise in satisfaction from 1998 to 2000
(which can be associated with the resumption of domestic activity after the 1998 devaluation of the ruble). Looking at transition matrices reveals a substantial m obility of individuals across the different satisfaction categories. On average, only about 40% of the population remains in the same category from one round to the other. Up to 50% of the not satisfied at all remain in that class throughout the study; the other categories are much less stable (Senik, 2002) . Frey and Stutzer, 2002) . We refer to the second notion.
5 A stream of recent research on political values, demand for redistribution and votes, hinges on subjective attitudinal questions including life satisfaction, e.g. Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2000) , Grüner (2000, 2001) , Di Tella and MacCulloch (2001) , Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) . 6 According to Diener et al. (1999) however, empirical studies reveal that the stable component of satisfaction is dominant in the satisfaction answers. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) The individual welfare function we estimate depends on current real individual income (log Y it ), income expectations formed in t-1 (E i t -1 ), the individual reference group's income (log Y reference it ), socio-demographic characteristics (X it ), and time and regional dummies, as well as inequality measures in some specifications:
Hence, with the ordered probit model:
with k = l, 4 and t = 1, 5 , where, F is a linear satisfaction function depending on a vector of characteristics X it , a parameter vector θ , a random variable ε it that follows a normal distribution, and a set of cut-points µ k .
In equation (2), the influence of the real income variable is obvious; ceteris paribus higher income should be synonymous with higher satisfaction. We use two categories of income: individual r eal income and household real income 9 . As our main interest lies with the influence of reference income, it is important to control for actual individual income, in order to separate the effect of both variables on satisfaction. However, a classical worry is that income is likely to be endogenous to satisfaction for two possible reasons. The reason is unobserved individual heterogeneity, say "personality". A happy, for instance extraverted, personality will generate both more productive behavior and more satisfaction, hence a spurious correlation between say wage and satisfaction. We deal with this problem by introducing the Mundlak distinction on exogenous variables (Table 3 .c) and by introducing individual fixed effects in Senik (2002) . The second risk is collinearity, as income and satisfaction may vary together, following some external cause. In order to deal with this issue, we introduce year and region dummies, which should capture much of the business cycle, and in addition, we include lagged individual income instead of current income. Because of measurement errors and risks of under-declaration of income, we also add real household income or real household expenditure 10 , following the idea that measurement errors are smaller regarding the latter variable (see Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001 , for example). All these financial categories are deflated using regional consumer price indices 11 . As is often the case, we use the natural logarithm of the income and expenditure categories: in the particular case of our model, this reflects the assumption that utility is a concave function of income.
The role of information and expectations is central to our discussion of satisfaction and reference income. Expectations may also influence satisfaction by raising the aspiration level. We thus control for lagged income expectations in some specifications, using what we see as an indicator of individual income expectations: "Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than today, or worse ?"( 5 proposed answers). In equation (2), X it is a vector of socio-demographic individual characteristics that influence life satisfaction (age, marital status, household size, mother tongue, religion, gender, health). Regional dummies capture the influence of unexplained location effects such as local public goods, local job market or good market externalities, or other local externalities. Lastly, I t is a set of year dummies that capture the effect of cyclical macroeconomic fluctuations on individual satisfaction. Eventually, we include variables related to the perception of income distribution, such as the reference group's income, Gini indices and Stark indices of income overhang, which are described in the following sub-sections.
Constructing the reference group income
Following Clark and Oswald (1996) , we estimate, round by round, in a first-stage regression, the logarithm of the typical real income of an individual, based on his education, years of experience, region, branch, age, sex, and primary occupation code (International Standard Classification of Occupations). We then include the post-11 Price indices are constructed at the level of PSUs. We build these deflators based on two sources of information. First, the Consumer Price Indices published by the Russian statistical organ Russian Economic Trends, available on their web site http://www.recep.org/ret/, and second, the ratio of regional to national poverty lines of RLMS. The formula of our deflator is then: Deflator jt = National Consumer Price Index t .
[ Σ (i ε j) (regional poverty line it )/ (all-Russian poverty line it ) ]. Where j =1, 38 stands for the Primary Sample Units of RLMS, i=1, 9000 stands for the households, t = 5, 9 stands for the rounds of the RLMS survey. Regional and national poverty lines are defined as the regional or national cost of a representative subsistence food basket, adjusted for each demographic group. Taking the ratio of these two indicators suppresses the influence of the adjustment for the demographic group. In a former version (Senik, 2002) , we used national consumer price indices, which yielded the same results.
estimation predicted individual income in the second stage estimation of life satisfaction, as a proxy for the individual's reference group income. The rationale is that this constructed variable is the average pay-off associated with the productive characteristics of a given individual. We believe that it has a substantial informational content. In a context where the association between skills and pay-offs is changing rapidly 12 and somewhat unpredictably, the observation of the typical income of people sharing the same skills and the same position is a good indicator of what an individual can expect for himself.
We estimate reference income on the whole sample of individuals 13 . However, there are people with no source of income at all. Note that the problem is mitigated by the fact that the notion of income in the RLMS is unusually extensive as it includes official as well as unofficial wages from primary, secondary and tertiary jobs, in cash or in kind, as well as transfer payments such as unemployment benefits and pensions; this should minimize the bias resulting from the selection of active people. Nonetheless, in order to correct for the participation bias, we use t he Heckman (1979) 
and the selection equation states that log individual income is observed if 14 :
γ 0 age + γ 1 gender + γ 3 (presence of a child under 7) + u 2j > 0 (4) Table A1 in the Appendix shows the results of the estimation of reference income at each round. As the predicted reference income is going to be included together with other explanatory variables in the estimation of life satisfaction, one should be careful about the risk of multicollinearity. Here, we exclude all the right hand side variables of the first stage estimation of the reference income from the second stage life satisfaction estimation, except gender (which has an obvious influence on both variables but partly for different reasons), as well as regional dummies, as these capture the influence of certain local externalities which are not necessarily related to level of wages. Note that the variables used in the estimation of reference income are not (or only weakly) significant determinants of life satisfaction. This is particularly true of industry and experience (Table A2 i n the Appendix) 15 . Hence, one can admit that the productive characteristics that are on the right hand side of the first-stage estimation only influence life satisfaction through the channel of the reference income category that they serve to generate.
As t he reference income is a prediction from a first-stage estimation, this makes the conventional standard errors of the second-stage estimation unreliable. We thus thereafter systematically report bootstrapped standard errors, based on 1000
replications.
Ine quality indices
We use Stark indices of income overhang STARKH (resp. STARKL) which measure the average difference between individual i's income and those of richer (resp. poorer) people, normalized by individual i's income. We also include GINI indices o f real income for each round. We construct these variables at three geographical levels:
Russia, the 8 regions described in Table A1 , and Primary Sample Units. (The RLMS effect. Note that we have checked that life satisfaction was not a significant determinant of participation in the labor market: participation does not seem to be endogenous to life satisfaction.
divides Russia into 2029 PSUS, of which about 100 are retained in the sample and include about 42 households each).
Results
We first present the general socio-demographic correlates of life satisfaction, we then discuss the role of reference group income; lastly, we turn to the influence of inequality.
The usual correlates of satisfaction
We check that the data generate the usual pattern of socio-demographic correlates of life satisfaction, which have been shown to be quite stable accross countries (Oswald, 1997 , Di Tella et al., 1996 , Diener and Suh, 1997 , Diener et al. 1999 ). As expected (Table A2 in the Appendix), satisfaction is U shaped in age, increases with subjective health and years of education, is positively correlated with religious belief, with being married rather than divorced or widowed, and with being a male (the gender effect is specific to Russia). Further, we find that life satisfaction is higher for those living in Moscow or St Petersburg metropolis and whose mother tongue is not Russian. Satisfaction decreases from round 5 to round 8 and then increases at round 9 (in 2000). Unsurprisingly, satisfaction is higher in more prestigious professions such as legislators, senior managers and officials, as well as for technicians who are in excess demand on the Russian labor market (see Grosfeld et al., 2001) , although the significance of the coefficients is exaggerated by the fact that the reference category is unemployed. As already noted by Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) , household income (column 4) or expenditure (column 2) are better predictors of satisfaction than individual income (column 3).
The influence of reference group income
We now include reference group income, constructed as indicated in section 2. We also include alternatively lagged individual income and "residual income", i.e. the difference between the individual's income and his reference income. In order to check for robustness, we also control, in alternative specifications, for the level of real household income or expenditure. This latter should help correct for possible measurement errors, in particular the under-declaration of income.
C. Senik, "When Information Dominates Comparison", May 2003. 13 We find that reference income exerts a positive and significant effect on individual satisfaction (Table 3 .a). This positive sign is systematic, whether we consider the specification with residual income (columns 1 to 3) or with lagged individual income (columns 4 and 5), whether we control for household income (column 3) or household expenditure (columns 2 and 4), and whether expectations are included or not. As expected, the coefficients on residual individual income, lagged individual income, household income and household expenditure are also positive and significant.
Note that the estimation of reference income yields: y i = z i + ε i , where y i is individual income, z i is estimated reference income and ε i is the residual from the estimation.
Neglecting the other variables, the estimated welfare function is:
is the residual income, and z i is the reference income. Hence, in order to test of the significance of the reference income, one needs to check whether β>0, i.e. whether the coefficient on the reference income z i is greater than the coefficient on the residual income ε i . The last rows in Table 3 .a (columns 1 to 3) show that this is indeed the case, and chi2 tests confirm that the difference is significant. We check that these results hold for two restrictions on the sample. Firstly, following the idea that the notion of reference income is more relevant for active people who actually do valorize their productive characteristics, we run the same regression keeping only employed people with a strictly positive individual income. This yields about 8000 observations, covering approximately 1800 individuals per round. Secondly, as men and women generally face different working conditions, the role of reference income may differ by sex, hence we isolate the sub-sample of working males, on the one hand, and working women on the other and (about 4000 observations for each sub-sample). The same result as in the general regression presented in Table 3 .a is found in each sub-C. Senik, "When Information Dominates Comparison", May 2003. 15 sample: reference income systematically exerts a positive and significant influence on life satisfaction 16 .
What is the order of magnitude of this effect? Computing marginal effects and calculating substitution ratios between the various income categories shows that the influence of reference income on life satisfaction is far from negligible. Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in the independent variable on the probability of choosing the satisfied answer to the life satisfaction question. It turns out ( Table 3 .b) that the marginal effect of reference income amounts to about 70% of the effect of an increase in actual individual income and about 50% of the effect of an increase in real household expenditure or income. The effect of reference income is more important than that of residual individual income and of lagged individual income.
These observations are consistent with the fact that household financial categories have more influence on life satisfaction than does individual income. We now introduce the Mundlak distinction between intra versus inter-individual effects.
Both effects are positive (Table 3 .c). As before, tests show that the coefficient of reference income is significantly higher than that on residual income (both on average and in variation). In terms of magnitude, we find that the intra-individual marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation in reference income is now equivalent to about 90% of a 1 standard deviation in household income or expenditure. The effect is again larger than an increase in residual income. For inter-individual effects, the order of magnitude is half as large. This observation is consistent with t he idea that it is the news conveyed by reference income that affect individual satisfaction, as there is clearly more information in the variation of the reference income than there is in its average level. These results are unusual. Studies in relative income typically find a negative relation between reference income and satisfaction, suggesting that only relative income matters. Clark and Oswald (1996) for instance, use a similar earnings equation to estimate the reference income of an individual, based on his productive characteristics (age, qualification, occupation, region, sex), using the 1991 wave of the British Household Panel Survey (5195 wage earners ). They find that job satisfaction depends negatively on what they call "comparison income". The same is true of the "satisfaction with pay".
Moreover, the coefficients of individual income and reference income, although of opposite sign, are not significantly different in absolute value, suggesting that job satisfaction is purely relative. As Clark and Oswald (1996) Netherlands (1980 and 1981) and show that the reference group's income (defined by the education level, employment status and age) increases the comparison norm µ i , which itself reduces the utility of income 20 . Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) obtain a different conclusion, more consistent with ours. They regress the RLMS "economic satisfaction" variable whereby individuals rank themselves on a 9 -rung ladder in terms of economic rank. They interpret the coefficient of the base year income as reflecting the influence of the relative income (change in the reference income with 17 The coefficient on the reference income is 0.320 (0.062) for round 5, 0.408 (0.068) for round 6, 0.298 (0.065) for round 7, 0.348 (0.073) for round 8 and 0.361 (0.049) for round 9.
18 It is not farfetched to imagine that the reference income can both decrease job satisfaction and increase life satisfaction; for instance, this could be the case if job satisfaction reflects a judgement on the agent's current position whereas life satisfaction also includes a notion of expected future improvement.
19 Clark and Oswald (1994) also show that the disutility of unemployment is relative: the unemployment of the relevant others is positively correlated with an unemployed person's GHQ-12 index of mental wellbeing. We interpret our result as a sign that in the context of the Russian transition, reference group categories play a predominantly informational role, whereas in more stable environments, they are more likely to act as norms of comparison. In other words, in a very rapidly changing context, social comparisons per se lose significance as relative positions are highly unstable. Rather, agents try to use as much information as possible in order to form their expectations concerning future v ariables. This implies that the effect should be stronger among the young, as they have the most to gain from information, and they have more time left to seize their job opportunities. Indeed (Table   3 .e), the effect is stronger for people under 40 years o ld: controlling for reference income and age, the coefficient on the interaction term young*reference income is positive and significant (column 1). This means that the positive slope of the curve relating satisfaction and reference income is higher for younger people than it is on average. Symmetrically (column 2), the coefficient on the interaction term old*reference income is negative and significant. We now present a series of complementary robustness tests that are meant to reinforce the informational conjecture and rule out alternative interpretations of our result.
Controlling for the direction of mobility
A skeptical view could be that the favorable influence of the reference income is driven by individuals who are upwardly mobile, or alternatively by the general wave of discontent and impoverishment that is overwhelming Russia. In order to test these ideas,
we separate the population in two groups: those whose real income has increased (or remained the same) as compared to the previous round, and those whose real income has decreased. As the division between the two populations could be endogenous to life satisfaction, we instrument the variation in income by computing the probability that income has increased from t-1 to t (using a probit model); we then divide the population in two groups, depending on whether the probability that their income has increased is superior or inferior to 0,5. Eventually, we run two separate regressions on the two groups. We find (Table 3 .f, columns 1 and 2) that the coefficient of reference income is positive and significant in both groups. Hence, it seems that for ascending, as well as for descending people, the progression of their peers is interpreted as a good news. We also check (Table 3 .f, columns 3 and 4) that the effect holds whether the individual's reference income has increased of decreased compared to the previous period.
This symmetry of the "tunnel effect" is certainly related to the uncertainty of the Russian environment. Most individuals are unsure about their future prospects and the valuation of their specific skills, because of rapid economic change. Hence, for currently descending people, the progression of their peers is taken as a promise of future improvement, while for ascending people, it is interpreted as a sign that the favorable evolution of their situation is based on objective grounds. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) show that up to 63% of persons belonging to the upper consumption decile in 1996 were in favor of restricting t he income of the rich; the same was true of 44% of the subjectively richest persons. This is because they expected their welfare to deteriorate in the next twelve months. Our own calculations show that on average, from 1994 to 2000, about 28% of the persons who belonged to the upper real income decile expected their situation to become worse or much worse in the next twelve months.
Uncertainty is thus present both at the top of the income ladder as well as at the bottom. Another interpretation, somewhat similar to the former, could be that the positive influence of reference income merely reflects the influence of individual income because both variables change in the same direction. In order to test this, we check that the effect of reference income is maintained whatever the relative situation of the individual, i.e. whether the change in his own income and his reference income coincide or not (Table 3 .g). This rules out the suspicion that relative income is just an instrument for individual income. Another alternative interpretation of our result is that reference income influences individual satisfaction not because of its informational content but because of the feeling of social domination that it is associated with. Belonging to the elite or to a rising social group is nicer than belonging to a low or declining social group because of "social rivalry". This is tantamount to a group-wise comparison effect whereby individuals do not compare themselves to other individuals, but compare their social group to other groups. In order to explore this conjecture, we successively include in the regression of life satisfaction, the subjective self-evaluation in terms of economic rank, power rank and respect rank (on 9-step ladders), as well as the objective income decile of individuals. All specifications show that the positive and significant effect of the reference income is maintained 21 . Thus, the effect of the reference income cannot be identified as a "social rivalry effect".
Some further tests of the role of uncertainty
In order to assess the cognitive role of reference income, we now include variables that capture the volatility and uncertainty that individuals are confronted with. First, we compute the standard deviation of individual real income across rounds; we divide the working population in two groups depending on whether their income variability is higher or lower than the average. We then run the usual regression on the two groups.
We find ( Table 3 .h) that the coefficient of reference income is significant only for people who experience high income volatility, hence whose income is less predictable (columns 1 and 2). This is consistent with the view that the reference income is used as a basis to form expectations about future income. We verify that the substitutability between reference income and expectations is greater for higher volatility groups.
As another proxy for uncertainty, we now use the answer to the following question:
How concerned are you about the possibility that you might not be able to provide yourself with the bare essentials in the next 12 months ? . Again, we divide the population in two groups, depending on whether they answer that they are concerned or not (we aggregate the multiple answer categories in order to obtain a dichotomic variable). We find (Table 3 .h, columns 3 and 4) that reference income plays the usual positive role for people who say they are anxious, but not for the others, a strong result in favor of the cognitive interpretation of the reference income. Lastly, we divide the population in two groups, depending on whether they are concerned that they might lose their job. Again, the effect of reference income is maintained for those who are concerned (column 5 in Table 3 .h), but not for the others (column 6 in Table 3 .h). All these results suggest that the reference level of income is used predominantly as an informational tool. We have checked that income expectations are actually increasing in reference income 22 . We have also checked that the result holds for the sub-population of individuals who correctly anticipated whether their income would increase or decrease.
Lastly, we checked that introducing current income expectations in the regression 22 When regressing the expectation variable (5 modalities) using an ordered probit, with the usual controls and precautions, the coefficient of reference income is 0.081, with a bootstrapped standard error of 0.027 which corresponds to a level of confidence of 0.002.
reduces the explanatory power of reference income, suggesting that the two variables are partly substitutes, which confirms the informational role played by the latter. The analysis of the role of inequality indices further reinforces this cognitive conjecture.
Inequality indices
When introducing inequality measures, whether Gini or Stark indices calculated at the national level, in life satisfaction regressions, we find that these are generally insignificant, whatever the specification and the controls used. This could be attributed to ignorance, i.e. people do not correctly perceive the distribution of income, hence it does not influence their satisfaction. To explore this idea, we include Stark and Gini indices calculated at the regional level (with eight regions, as defined in Table A1 ), assuming that people may have a better perception of the distribution of income in their region rather than in the whole country. It turns out that regional inequality indices are insignificant as well (Senik, 2002) . Eventually, we re-calculate the Gini and Stark indices at the Primary Sample Units level, which could be a more relevant scale of local perception. This does not alter the results concerning the non-influence of the Gini indices on satisfaction (Table 4 ). The same is true of the STARKH indices. Only the STARKL indices, which measure the distance of individual i's income to those poorer than him, attract a positive and significant coefficient. This variable is statistically a substitute for the subjective economic rank of the individuals (column 4).
Yet, we can check that people do perceive their relative position with respect to the national or regional distribution of income. When asked about their subjective relative economic rank (on a 9 -step ladder), their answer is significantly correlated with their actual position in the distribution of income, as represented by the STARKH index or their decile of real individual income (see Senik, 2002) . Thus, while inequality has no statistical influence on life satisfaction, it is not because individuals are unaware of it.
Hirschman's conjecture that the revenues of other people affect me through the information they convey can again be used to interpret this result. In a society where income distribution is perceived to change rapidly, the observed static distribution of income does not contain much informational value. This could explain why it does not affect individual subjective satisfaction. The same general framework can be applied to explain the low aversion for inequality in the United States that Alesina et al. (2000) have revealed 23 . Introducing Gini indices in the estimation of life satisfaction, they show that inequality indices play an exceptionally weak role in the satisfaction of Americans, as compared to Europeans. Their interpretation is that when (perceived) expected mobility is high, the perception of static inequality is dominated by the prospect for mobility. 
Conclusion
This study has revealed unusual findings. Although basic socio-demographic variables A brighter version, close to Hirschman's intuition, would be that Russians are optimistic about their chance to gain from the transformation process, which makes them neutral to the perception of immediate inequality. Whatever the preferred version, the general conclusion is that it is not always the case that people engage into social comparisons based on frustration or domination schemes. Transition could well be a case in which people go back to «fundamentals» and care only about their own outcomes, including the information necessary to predict them.
Beyond the case of transition economies, how general is the conjecture that other people's revenues affect me essentially through their informational content? And how much does the respective role of information versus comparison depend on the features of the environment such as the degree of uncertainty and the prospect for mobility? This question has obvious policy implications, in particular in the field of redistribution policy 24 . We believe that there is room for further empirical research in this direction. -0,271 -0,28 -0,219 -0,283 (0,204) (0,207) (0,246) (0,203) Government and security -0,055 -0,1 -0,019
